Complex socio-economic networks such as transportation networks, information systems and even underground organizations are often designed for resilience -to be able to function even if some of the nodes (e.g. hubs, routers, operatives etc.) are compromised by a human or natural adversary. In many cases the adversary threatens to cause a cascade where the failure of one node leads to some of the adjacent nodes being lost as well, and then many more nodes lost in a far-reaching domino eect. Such cascades motivate the search for mechanisms and network designs that would increase network cascade resilience. This work introduces a mathematical model in which such networks are viewed as the solution to an optimization problem that trades o cascade resilience against eciency, and describes the optimal networks under this model. The results show that of the network designs considered, a network consisting of multiple star-like cells is optimal. Also, perhaps surprisingly it was found that in many network designs and parameter values, edge density of the optimal network topology does not monotonically decrease when cascade risk increases, but may increase again when cascade risk is high. This implies that certain networks ought not to be modied for cascade resilience, since the cost in eciency is too high. Understanding cascade resilience and its structural phase transitions will ultimately help identify vulnerabilities and design more durable networks in many diverse application areas.
Introduction
Contagions on networks have been a major theme in the eld of network research. For example, in a power grid the loss of a single transmission or generation node may cause nearby nodes to be overloaded, becoming disconnected or damaged. This failures might propagate widely through the network, leading to widespread blackouts and large damage to the economy. Rebuilding the network might involve both repair of hardware and complex start-up procedures that would take considerable time. These cascade phenomena are also found in other domains such as disease control, computer networks, nancial markets If one of the nodes (i.e. operatives) is captured by law enforcement agencies, it may betray all the nodes connected to it leading to their probable capture.
The focus of this work is to investigate a novel problem in network research -how to build cascade-resilient networks. To date much research has explored the extent of cascades and the nature of their propagation, specically looking at important classes of networks [6, 9, 17, 18, 30] . Here the focus is dierent in that the topology is not xed because in many networks cascade resilience is a design criterion. By resilience it is meant the ability to reduce the extent of contagions. The objective here is to identify topological features that can endow networks with high contagion resilience. It is hoped that ultimately it would be possible to identify a general prescription for building cascade-resilient networks for many dierent domains. Finding such features would be useful not only in networks that are being designed de novo, but also in a much broader class of networks where some changes could be made to the topology even if complete redesign is infeasible. This include power grids (which could be locally upgraded), social networks facing epidemics (through isolation of certain nodes) and others.
Because the relative importance of eciency and resilience depends on operating conditions, the optimal design is expected to be not a single pattern, but multiple dierent patterns, with possible sharp transitions between them.
In research of terrorism and guerrilla movements, a classic pattern is the treeof-cliques cellular hierarchy ( Fig.1) [24, 19] (see also research on crime networks in industry [3] , and drugs [25] ). However, it is clear that both in terrorism and in other domains the optimal topology depends on conditions such as the risk of cascades and the purpose of the network. Indeed, while the cellular tree design is very secure, its tree-like structure is very vulnerable to becoming disconnected. Moreover, the near-tree structure means that messages propagating on the network would take many hops to reach their destination, which limits this pattern's operational eciency.
The model introduced in this paper addresses this problem in a simplied context of graph theory, as follows. It is clear that in many networks it is possible to increase cascade resilience by many means, not only through their topology. For instance, in controlling respiratory diseases, it is possible to ask people to wear face mask reducing the spread of contagions. Also, in clandestine social networks one sees additional types of nodes (dead drops or couriers) whose purpose is to prevent cascades. Those types of defenses are interesting both in practice and in theory, but they involve heterogeneous graphs (with multiple types of nodes and edges) whose models are both more complex and application-specic. Therefore here the focus is on simple graphs as models of networks in the view that the conclusions derived from such models would also be applicable to more complex situations. In the remainder, the words network and graph G will be used to mean the same object: a tuple (V, E), where V is a set of nodes and E is a set of edges, where each edge is an unordered pair of nodes. [24] . In the battalion gure, a leaf node corresponds to the leader of a group (subordinates not shown).
Even on simple graphs, designing resilience to cascades is not a simple problem to formulate. As was suggested by the tree-of-cliques, in practical network designs it is necessary to balance resilience with suitably-dened performance/eciency. Indeed, intuitively the most cascade-resilient network is the network with no edges (no cascades can propagate), but it is also the least useful kind of network. Therefore, searching for the most resilient design is not the right objective. Rather the true objective is to maximize a certain combination of resilience and eciency, which is termed tness. It is expected that typically maximizing resilience and maximizing eciency will be in opposition. Just as disconnected networks are resilient and inecient, highly-ecient networks such as complete graphs are likely to have low resilience [34] .
Such a trade-o suggests formulating the question us one of mixed-objective optimization, where the solution space is a space of simple graphs possibly with a xed number nodes. In this formulation one must overcome two keys problems.
First, this is a very large search space even if the number of nodes and edges in the graph is as small as a hundred. Secondly, it is important to be able to smoothly measure eciency in both connected and disconnected topologies but many familiar graph functions are only suitable for only connected topologies.
Both of those issues are addressed here: to reduce the search space the graphs are constructed using parametrized generating programs, and eciency is measured by a metric termed distance-attenuated reach.
Research on sociological networks indicates that resilience and eciency might be just two of several design criteria that also include e.g. informationprocessing requirements, that impose additional constraints on network designs [3] . In the original context information-processing refers to the need to have ties between individuals involved in a particular task, when the task has high complexity. Each individual might have a unique set of expertise into which all the other agents must tap directly. Generalizing from sociology, such functional constraints might considerably limit the exibility in constructing resilient and ecient networks. For example, in the context of terrorism, this constraint signicantly decreased the quality of attacks that could be successfully carried out in the post 9/11 security environment [33] . Such functional constraints could be addressed by looking at a narrow set of models of networks which already incorporate such constraints. The specic models to be examined are motivated by analytical expediency, but in general one may want to consider a particular design palette dictated by the application at hand. The current objective is to identify which elements might be useful for increasing the tness of networks, and thus suggest elements that are useful to have in the palette, even if it is constrained.
There is a very extensive literature on both cascades and resilience. For instance, a number of investigations considered resilience to removal of nodes or edges. An important result in this domain is that certain types of scale-free networks but not others are sensitive to targeted node removal [1, 5, 7, 11, 16, 15] . Interesting research looked at dierent models of contagion [6, 10] , as well as non-topological mechanisms for increasing resilience [21, 26] . The general area of resilience has attracted a lot of research in the area of secret societies such as terrorist networks [13, 2, 14, 25, 34] . In fact many secret societies are benign, including non-governmental organizations and dissident movements operating in hostile political environments. Related problems have also been studied in epidemiology, where the question focused on immunization strategies (e.g. [31] ) but apparently not as a question of optimal network design. Gametheoretic methods have recently been applied to the resilience-eciency trade-o in terrorist network design [23, 22] .
The main contribution of this work is to systematically attack the problem of building cascade-resilient networks. The closest to the current work is the short report [29] (but it uses a very dierent model of cascades involving node capacities). Also novel is a metric for dening eciency of networks, which enables studying both connected and disconnected topologies.
The organization of this paper is as follows: section 2 formalizes the problem mathematically and section 3 introduces various classes of networks. The results are exhibited in section 4, and discussed in section 5. Mathematical details are found in the Appendix.
Formal Model
The novel approach here is to represent the resilience-eciency trade-o above as an optimization problem where the decision variable is the topology of a graph and the objective function is a metric combining resilience and eciency termed tness, F (G). Namely, the problem is to nd the graph G(V, E) chosen from a set G that solves
where:
The set G is here called the design of the network. This design could be quite narrow (e.g. an Erdos-Renyi random graph on n nodes [28] ) or very broad (e.g. any n-node graph). Both of the functions R(G) and W (G) (W stands for work) will have range ⊆ [0, 1], to make them independent of network size. The parameter r weighs resilience against eciency, and depends on the problem being studied. Much of the discussion below will be about around point r = 0.5 in which the two are weighed equally. On a practical level, r could be interpreted as the cost of restoring the network after a cascade -is it light or catastrophic.
In order to dene R(G) one needs to provide (a) a realistic model of contagions, and (b) a metric of contagion resilience relevant to that model, and then repeat steps (a)&(b) for W (G). In the next subsection two simple measures of R(G) and W (G) are introduced that should be applicable to a range of dierent scenarios. However, in many problems it is interesting to consider the general formulation (1) above, even if the denitions of resilience and eciency are different. The issue of dening a suitable set of graphs G is more challenging due to the size of the search space, and is discussed in section 3.
Measuring Resilience
Research on graph theory has led to the development of a variety of metrics of robustness or resilience [19] . However, unlike in many other studies here the interest is in resilience to cascades not to e.g. disconnection. A natural denition of resilience is the expected size of the surviving network as a fraction of the whole, for a cascade that originates at a single node:
For simplicity, assume that cascades start at all nodes with uniform probability.
It would be easy to extend this to cases where factors such as graph topology, node degree and even node type (for heterogeneous graphs) play a role. Note that the denition considers the case where cascades spread beyond the immediate neighbors of the start node, since this possibility is important in practice.
A simple model of a contagion is the following probabilistic model: each node in the graph can be in one of three states susceptible, infected and removed designated S, I and R respectively (these names are from epidemiology). Time is assumed to move in uniform discrete steps. A node in S state at time t stays in this state, unless a neighbor infects the node, causing it to move to state I at time t + 1. Specically, a node in state S at time t has a node-independent probability τ of turning to I state at time t + 1 if an adjacent node is at state I at time t. Finally, a node in I state at time t would always become R at time t+1. Once in state R, a node would remain there for all future times. In general the rate of transition I → R could take more than one time step but adding this eect would mostly serve to increase the probability of transmission [27] , which is already parametrized by τ . Indeed, in certain application the time-step model is very realistic, where reportedly groups train agents to hold information for a set time period, so that their contacts have time to hide.
Measuring Eciency
The problem of measuring eciency is even more involved than the problem of resilience because eciency can only be computed by knowing the ultimate function of a network. Yet, the function could be very dependent on the network, even if the contagion structure is similar. Ideally, the eciency metric would (a) be general enough for a variety problems, (b) be suitable for both connected, weakly-connected and disconnected networks and (c) computationally and analytically simple. It is clear that for many applications the distance between pairs of nodes in the network is the most important determinant of the network's eciency. This idea motivates the following distance-attenuated reach metric of eciency, which gives the average neighborhood size of each node, corrected by the distance to the nodes in this neighborhood. Namely, for all nodes u ∈ V , weigh each v ∈ V {u} by the inverse of its distance to u:
where g > 0 is a parameter and normalization by n(n − 1) ensures that 0 ≤ W (G) ≤ 1. As usual, for any node v disconnected from u, set
Thus, if the network has short paths, then the metric would approach 1.0 because V u,d would be large for small d, and if it has long paths or is disconnected, then V u,d would be small for small d. for some D > 0 to take into account the possibility of connecting to nodes through a costly alternative route that bypasses the given network.) The parameter g could be termed connectivity attenuation of the network because it represents the rate at which distance decreases the connectivity between nodes. In some problems (such as the Internet) the presence of v on the same connected component as u is completely sucient for providing the services of v to u (such as serving documents), implying that g → 0. In other problems (such as trust networks) one can trust only one's friends and much less their friends, corresponding to attenuation g 1. Attenuation is expected to have a signicant eect on the optimization problem because it is hard to build resilient networks when the attenuation is rapid because to decrease cascade risk one cannot reduce the density of edges, as such a reduction would radically reduce eciency W (G).
In general, the current modeling approach is interesting to contrast with the work of Lindelauf et al. on terrorist networks [23, 22] . Like here, they consider two optimization criteria: secrecy and information, corresponding to resilience and eciency. Their secrecy metrics are based on the idea that the capture of a member of secret group will lead to the loss of their immediate neighbors, with some probability. The issue of cascades is not considered, probably for reasons of analytic tractability. The metric of information is dened by looking at the average shortest-path distance between pairs of nodes (and the network is required to be connected). Most dierent is the interesting application of game theory to nd the optimal network. Whereas here the optimal network is the solution to an optimization problem, their optimal network is the Nash equilibrium in a bargaining game involving a secrecy player and an information player.
The above denitions of eciency and resilience provide an intuition about the optimal design of a network. Since edges increase eciency of the graph, as the probability of cascades decreases (τ → 0), regardless of design, the optimal network would grow more dense in order to reduce the average distance on the network. However, since cascades propagate through edges, as τ → 1, the optimal networks would become more sparse in order to maximize resilience at the expense of eciency. As would be shown in the results section, this intuition is often incorrect.
Network Designs
The optimization problem above faces the dicult obstacle of a large solution space. For general graphs on say n nodes, the set of possible solutions to the above problem has huge cardinality: 2 ( n 2 ) (counting isomorphisms). Therefore, any practical approach must identify a relatively small subset of that huge space.
Moreover, given a set of highly-rated networks (eg. top 1%), it may be challenging to characterize them -to identify what features give those particular networks their desirable properties.
Solution Approach
In order to solve those two problems, this work considers what is arguably the most important subset of the search space. Namely, the focus is on the set of all graphs on n nodes which can be constructed using a number of simple models termed network designs. Each model contains parameters which specify how the network is to be generated, where each setting of the parameters is termed conguration. Thus, instead of searching through the space of graphs, the search is through the set of programs generating graphs from a model, or more concretely, the search is through the set of parameters that control those programs. The process is similar to evolution where selection occurs on the phenotype of organisms -here: graphs -but the organisms are largely specied by their genotype -here: the designs and their conguration parameters.
In other words, each design D has congurations C As to the characterization problem, given that one would know how the networks were generated, one can more easily characterize the optimal designs simply by looking at the parameter values of the programs that generated them.
Implicitly, this procedure assumes that for a given set of parameter values all of the models/programs produce similar networks, as far as eciency and resilience are concerned. Hence, the words network and conguration will be used interchangeably, even though the former refers to a single graph, while the latter to a class graphs generated using the same process.
Another advantage of this approach over brute-force enumeration is that a graph-generating program is an analog of instructions or protocols by which real networks are constructed. Practical limitations prevent those instructions from being complex, and hence the set of graphs constructed by such a program is the more relevant search space for practical applications, than the set of all graphs on n nodes, 2 ( n 2 ) .
Network Designs
A variety of graph generating models have been proposed: Poisson [12] , small world [32] , preferential attachment [4] , and many others. However, the models recreate networks whose construction principles are quite dierent from what is called for in cascade-resilient networks. In particular, many models produce graphs with a relatively large number of high degree nodes -a feature that strongly promotes cascades [9] and under certain conditions even facilitates epidemics that sweep most of the nodes in the network [30] . While in some applications (such as scientic collaboration networks) cascades are desirable, the situation is reversed here. parameter, k -the number of nodes in the cell, in addition to n -the total number of nodes. Let us also consider graphs consisting of (d) randomly-connected cliques, (e) randomly-connected stars, in both cases according to probability p (termed the cavemen graph and connected stars graph, respectively) as well as (f ) the simpler Erdos-Renyi G(n, p) random graph with probability p (see Fig. 2 ). Analytic expressions of the tness for some of those designs are available (see Appendix, sec. D).
Armed with those designs, the computation below will determine which of them is optimal (i.e. how to build the cascade-resilience network), as well as how the optimal design should be congured (e.g. how large should each cell be). The networks produced by dierent congurations of a single design could be quite dierent from each other. For instance, the cellular designs could be congured to create networks of multiple disconnected components 1 , as well as the more extreme networks without any edges or with all nodes in the same component. Some of the designs generalize others, implying that they are expected to perform at least as good: the connected stars design includes both the Erdos-Renyi design (by setting k = 1) as well as the stars design (by setting p = 0). Similarly, the cavemen graph includes both the Erdos-Renyi random graph (by setting k = 1) as well as the cliques graph (by setting p = 0). Note also that some designs have structural limitation so that possibly none of their congurations can achieve R(G) = 1 or W (G) = 1, respectively. For example, the stars design cannot achieve W (G) = 1 for any positive attenuation exponent. As we shall see, this will eect its optimal conguration for extreme values of the parameters.
It is clear that the above palette of designs is far too short to provide immediate value to all of the application areas where cascade resilience is desired.
The objective here is to propose an approach which could be applied to dierent domains, as well as begin constructing a theory to address cascade resilience.
It should also be noted that the optimal design is likely to be a function of exogenous parameters such as cascade risk, τ , weight of resilience, r, as well the application area: functional constraints which may make some of the designs unsuitable.
A particularly important problem is understanding the structure of terrorist networks. These networks are prototypical examples of networks that are maximized to resilience -their adversary is various government agencies, and ef-1 It has been argued that disconnected graphs are not realistic as models for many applications, but several reasons suggest otherwise. First, a variety of networks are only connected in the topological sense, and in fact, a very small number of edges act as bridges between parts of the network. Second, in many networks certain edges are highly resilient to cascade propagation, or could be made to be. Thus the disconnected network provides a simplied model of networks containing regular and resilient edges. ciency -to be able to recruit and to carry out terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, it is hard to obtain detailed data on their structure, with the notable exception of the 9/11 network [20] and some historic underground groups, such as FTP illustrated in the introduction. For the FTP network, a battalion (228 nodes, 462 edges) was constructed based on the account in [24] . Although both the FTP ghters and the 9/11 terrorists are secret societies, the author does not propose any moral equivalence between their objectives.
Results
This section addresses several questions. The rst is to determine which of the designs is optimal, which may depend on the settings of the parameters. Recall that the model includes the parameters τ , r and g representing contagion risk, the importance of resilience as opposed to eciency, and the attenuation of the network, respectively. Second, within each design, what is the optimal conguration?
Optimal Network
In the rst set of experiments, the connectivity was kept to at g = 1, and the contagion risk (τ ) was varied. In each setting, the optimal conguration of each design was determined. It can be seen that the connected stars network is optimal (Fig. 3) and except for the τ ≤ 0.1, the star network (without a connection between leaders) is almost as t. The optimality of the star-based networks is due to a good trade-o between R and W : the central node in each cell (its leader) provides a good rewall against cascades, because most pairs are separated by distance of 2 (unlike in cliques where separation is 1), but this separation reduces eciency only modestly, unlike the much longer average distance in the cycle graph.
An interesting qualitative observation is that within each design, as τ increases, the tness decreases -one cannot win when ghting cascades, only delay. This monotonicity could be proved in general (see Appendix, sec. B).
Consider now the empirical networks: 9/11 and FTP. It is interesting that the 9/11 network is quite successful for low values of τ (< 0.2), but then it rapidly deteriorates. This is due to a rapid increase in the extent of cascades -rapid decline in resilience. This onset of rapid decline suggests that in some types of networks, the network might be initially hard to defeat, but there is a point after which eorts against it start to pay o. If τ is representative of the security environment, then one can say that the 9/11 is relatively ill-adapted to more rigorous security measures implemented after the attacks. Indeed, it is likely that the 9/11 attacks would have been thwarted under the current regime since one of the nodes was captured before 9/11. In contrast, the cellular tree risk τ , but the average distances in it are too long to provide high eciency. Therefore, its performance in very low and very high ranges of τ is comparatively poor.
In certain applications it is possible to invest in reducing the cascade propagation probability, τ (e.g. using nomes de guerre in a secret society). Then the curves in Fig. 3 could also be viewed as expressing the value of eorts to reduce cascades by reducing τ . If the slope is steep then the gains are large. It is important to remember that the tness curves indicate the tness of the optimal conguration of each design, rather than a static network. If, however, the conguration was made xed then the tness decrease would be even steeper as τ increased since changing the conguration can mitigate some of the decrease.
The tness of an optimal network is a continuous function of the parameter r, and so the counterpart of Fig. 3 but for r = 0.51 is almost indistinguishable (see Appendix, sec. A for justication). In contrast, resilience, eciency and the structure of the network may experience discontinuous phase transitions as r is changed. One such transition occurs at r = 0.5 (Fig. 4,5, 13 ). Below r < 0.5 when cascade risk is high (τ 0) the optimal design maximizes eciency, whereas for r > 0.5 it maximizes resilience.
Intuition suggested that the networks grow more sparse as contagion risk grows. Instead, the results were surprising because the trend was non-monotonic (Fig. 6) . Unexpectedly, for τ → 1 and r < 0.5 some network designs (e.g. 10 notice that decreasing g improves the tness of the optimal congurations, as expected. Furthermore when g is small, it is easy to nd highly-optimal conguration because the networks could be made sparse -improving cascaderesilience without signicantly reducing eciency. In contrast, when attenuation g is large, eciency cannot be achieved and the optimal conguration of the stars design is to have cells of size 1 maximizing resilience. It is perhaps surprising that for smaller g, high tness is most dicult to achieve when eciency and resilience are approximately equally weighted (i.e. r is near 0.5), especially when τ is near 1.0.
The attenuation g has also interesting eects on the relative merits of various designs (Fig. 8) . For example, the cycle design is not competitive with star when g = 1.0 but when g = 0.1 the relatively large distance in cycles do not decrease eciency very much, and they help stop cascades. 
Discussion
The success of the star design could be analyzed more qualitatively. The tness function combines resilience R(G) which decreases when the graph becomes more strongly connected, and eciency W (G) which decreases when the graph becomes more sparse. The existence of a non-trivial solution is due to the dierent functional relationships. To a rst-order approximation, eciency decreases inversely with average distance (∼ 1 avg distance g ) while cascade propagation probability decreases exponentially (∼ τ avg distance , for τ < 1 assuming a bounded number of alternative paths). For example, for the star design R = 1 − τ 2 and W = 2 −g as n = k → ∞. Therefore, the optimal network's structure exploits the exponential decrease in cascades without sacricing too much eciency. In the range τ ∈ [0.2, 0.7] and r ≈ 0.5, an average distance of ≈ 2, as in the star graph, might be optimal.
Community organization might play a role in tness. Notice that the connected stars graph includes the random graph (by setting k = 1) however for most values of τ , connected stars performs much better (similarly in cavemen vs.
cliques) -why? Perhaps to achieve high performance it is helpful to build the graph around communities -sets of densely-connected nodes. Indeed the optimal conguration away from τ → 0 is precisely based on k > 1 (see Appendix,
sec. E). The eect of community structure on cascades has been explored extensively, but this is the rst evidence that it could be done while maintaining eciency.
The nding that under high cascade risk the optimal network is dense is interesting, because our expectation was that the optimal network would be sparse and tree-like. Instead, it was found that at high τ values the optimal networks have low objective values ( for instance non-violent resistance movements, like the movement that brought about the independence of India and Pakistan or those involved in the recent reforms in Serbia, Ukraine and Georgia. The organizers of those movements intentionally chose to organize openly rather to form an underground. This openness greatly facilitated the movement's growth, although it put at risk the individuals who participated. The parallel in our model is to the sacrice of resilience to cascades in order to gain higher eciency. This work suggests that such a sacrice is worth making even when cascade risk is high as long as eciency is more valued or replacing nodes is easy (r < 0.5).
Conclusions and Future Work
This work has explored the problem of designing networks for cascade resilience.
The main contributions are:
• A general denition of the problem as a multi-objective optimization problem • Metrics for eciency and resilience that work well in various networks, including disconnected topologies Claim: f (r) = max G∈G F (G, r) is continuous for r ∈ [0, 1]. Proof: Consider an optimal conguration C 1 of a design for r = r 1 and let its tness be f 1 = F (C 1 , r 1 ). Observation 1: at r = r 2 the tness of C 1 is dierent by at most|r 2 − r 1 |, explicitly: |F (C 1 , r 2 ) − f 1 | ≤ |r 2 − r 1 | (by linearity of Eq. 1 in R and W and because 0 ≤ R ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ W ≤ 1). Observation 2: the optimal conguration for r = r 2 , C 2 , with tness f 2 = F (C 2 , r 2 ) must satisfy f 2 − f 1 ≤ |F (C 1 , r 2 ) − f 1 | ≤ |r 2 − r 1 |, otherwise it would contradict that f 1 is the optimal tness for r = r 1 and/or contradict Observation 1. Similar arguments applied to C 1 imply that f 1 − f 2 ≤ |r 2 − r 1 |. Continuity is then proved by taking the limit: lim r2→r1 |f 1 − f (r 2 )| ≤ lim r2→r1 |r 2 − r 1 | = 0.
B Extent and Contagion Risk
Proposition: Let
be the tness of the optimal graph G * for a xed network design G, for cascade probability τ . Then f (τ ) is a non-increasing function of τ .
Proof of Proposition: The proof relies on a simple claim that resilience of networks does not increase when τ increases. Namely:
, that is, increasing cascade probability does not increase resilience.
Take the claim as given, and assume by contradiction that τ + > τ and
Let G * τ+ , G * τ by any two optimal networks for τ + and τ , respectively, namely:
Expanding ∆:
This implies that F (G * τ , τ ) − F (G * τ+ , τ ) < 0 and therefore contradicts that G * τ is an optimal network for τ (Eq. 5).
Proof of Claim: Consider the rst step of the cascade, i.e. as it expands from a single node in state I. There are no removed nodes, and hence, if the initial node is not disconnected, the probability the contagion would reach any other node is strictly greater for τ + . Next, consider any state K of the graph containing nodes in S,I, and R modes (susceptible, infected and removed, resp.). Consider also any state K which can be produced in one cascade event from K (note that the time steps of the simulation above may each contain several such events). The possible dierences between K and K are a single node (1) changing I → R or a node (2) changing S → I. Observe that the probability of either event happening is not smaller under τ + as compared to τ . Since any cascade can be decomposed into cascade steps, the expected extent of the contagion is not smaller under τ + as compared to τ . In sum, the expected size of the contagion is greater for τ + . More formally, let X i,t be the event that the contagion is in state i at time t, where a state contains information on which nodes are in each of the S, I, R modes. Consider two network states X j,t+1 and X k,t+1 , reachable from X i,t where X k,t+1 has not less nodes in level I. Under the measure induced by τ + the probability of transitions to state X k,t+1 is not smaller than under τ , for all such states. By induction on t from 1 to t (t is time where the epidemic has no more infected nodes, i.e. nodes in level I), the mean extent must be not smaller for τ + .
C Simulation Methodology
The resilience metric is most easily computed by simulation where a node is selected at random to be infected, and the simulation is run until all nodes are in states S or R, and none is in state I. A contagion that starts at a single node would run for up to n steps, but usually much fewer since typically τ < 1
and/or the graph is not connected. To achieve good estimate of the average extent, the procedure was replicated 40 times, and then continued as long as necessary to achieve an error of under ±1node with a 95% condence interval. For each design and conguration, the program generated 1 − 10 sample networks (depending on the variability characteristic of the design) of 100 nodes each, and computed the average objective function value. The coecient of variation in the tness of the sample networks was monitored to ensure that the average is a reliable measure of performance. Typically variation was < 0.2 except near phase transitions of connectivity and percolation. In designs consisting of cells of size k, in order to consider a spectrum of k values some of which might not divide 100, the number of nodes was chosen to be either the largest multiple of k less than 100 or the smallest multiple larger than 100. If k was fractional, cell sizes were sampled from a normal distribution with mean k and standard deviation 0.3. In general, numerical experiments showed that normalization in the denitions of resilience and eciency ensures that even when the number of nodes is tripled the eect of network size on tness is very small for the above designs (around ±0.05).
Optimization was performed using simple grid search without grid renement but alternative methods (e.g. Nelder-Mead) were considered. Grid search was chosen despite its computational cost because it suers no convergence problems even in the presence of noise (present due to variations in topology and contagion extent), and collects data useful for sensitivity analysis.
An analytic computation of the cascade extent metric was investigated. It is possible in theory because the contagion is a Markov process with states in the superset of the set of nodes, 2 n . Unfortunately, such a state space is impractically large. When G is a tree, then an analytic expression exists 2 , and it might be feasible when the treewidth is small [8, 27] . However, in many graphs 2 Specically, the mean contagion size is 1 + pG 0 (1) 1−pG 1 (1) , where G 0 (x) generates the degree distribution and
generates the probability of arrival to a node [27] . below the tree approximation is not suitable. A fruitful approximate approach is to represent the contagion approximately as a system of dierential equations which can be integrated numerically [18] . These analytic possibilities were not pursued since the simulation approach was sucient and could be applied to all graphs.
D Analytic Results
The information provided by simulations is valuable but limited, as simulations cannot be run for the entire innity of parameter values and design congurations. Fortunately, it is possible to analytically derive the values of the resilience, eciency (and hence tness) functions for certain simple designs: the cycles and the stars designs. Recall that n is the number of nodes and k is the number of nodes per cell. For k = 1, in both designs R = 1 and W = 0. When k ≥ 2, for the cycle design:
and for the stars design:
These expressions are not readily useful for continuous optimization since k is discrete, but they can be used to obtain a plot of the tness function, and identify phase transitions. Thus, they help inform optimization for designs where no analytic expression is available.
In the stars design, when R and W are weighted equally (r =
), tness takes a relatively simple form:
. This implies that increasing cell size k, for k large, improves tness i 2 −g − τ 2 > 0.
Hence the optimal conguration has one cell (k = n), until a threshold near τ = 2 −g/2 (for g = 1, approximately 0.71). This agrees with the ndings in Fig. 9 .
Also, the rate of change in tness with respect to τ ,
is always negative, as expected on more general grounds (see Appendix, sec. B).
It is linear in τ (because it is a tree graph) but superlinear in k (because of the mutual hazard induced by adding nodes to cells.)
E Conguring the Optimal Design
As τ is varied, the optimal conguration changes. This section shows those changes in the values of the parameters k (cell size) and p (connectivity). In other words, it indicates how each of the designs ought to be congured to attain optimal tness, as a function of resilience weighting, r, and cascade probability, τ . The cell size parameter k is non-monotonic for various designs under r < 0.5 (Fig. 9) . For example, for the cavemen design, at low contagion risk (τ < 0.1), k is high (comparable to the size of the network, i.e. k → n), then it falls to a small number. At high contagion risk (τ > 0.6) the network is again highly connected again with k → n. Thus for τ → 1, the optimal network is the fully-connected graph.
In general, designs involving both the p and k parameters show an intricate interplay between the two (Fig. 10) . For example, in the connected stars design under r < 0.5 there are two phase-transitions in connectivity p: as τ increases at τ → τ * l ≈ 0.1 it transitions from a connected graph to disconnected cells, and at τ → τ * u ≈ 0.7 back to full connectivity. If r > 0.5 the second transition is extinguished. The data requires care to interpret: under r > 0.5 the uctuations in the p in the range τ ∈ [0.1, 0.65] of the connected stars design are noise because there is a single cell and a single cell leader (k = n), and so the parameter p has no eect. For sensitivity analysis see Appendix, section F. 
F Sensitivity Analysis
It is desirable to determine how much variability exists within the optimal values. One possible approach is to consider all congurations whose tness ≥ 0.95 of the tness of the optimal solution, and describe the variability in this space.
Since in practice the space is innite, sampling is necessary. The plots of standard deviation within various properties of those congurations are shown in 
